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Abstract
In Latin America, the agenda of sexual and reproductive rights advocated by the 
feminist and LGBTI movements has challenged the hegemony of the sexual order held 
by traditionalist sectors, especially the hierarchy of the Catholic Church and conservative 
evangelical churches. These religious groups have reacted, in turn, to arrest the advance 
of feminist and LGBTI agendas. Beyond conservative Catholic and evangelical hierarchies, 
opposition activists also include religious academic institutions, politicians, Christian lay 
movements, and civil society groups, among others, all committed to a more restrictive 
view of sexuality. One important strategy of this ‘Pro-Life’ activism in recent years has 
been the conformation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This article offers an 
analysis of the emergence and development of ‘Pro-Life’ NGOs in Argentina. Using both 
quantitative and qualitative data, it examines three strategic movements made by these 
NGOs from the 1980s to the present: a state-political turn that favored strategies aimed 
to colonize the state and to impact sexual policies and the law; a blurring of religious 
identities; and a process of federalization and civil ecumenism.
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Introduction
Sexuality constitutes a dynamic and publicly contested terrain that is subject to 
power struggles that constantly transform it. Expressions of sexuality outside 
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the context of reproductive and matrimonial mandates have come into conflict 
with traditional ideologies that had confined sexuality exclusively within the 
limits of heterosexuality, conjugality, monogamy, and procreation (Htun 2003; 
Vaggione 2005). The widespread use of new reproductive and non-reproductive 
technologies developed in recent decades has led to radical transformations 
and new possibilities for the sexual practices (Plummer 2003). At the same time, 
in Latin America, the struggles initiated in the 1970s by groups excluded based 
on their gender and sexual expressions, organized around the agendas of femi-
nisms and LGBTI1 movements, have successfully politicized sexuality while vali-
dating new paradigms that move sexuality from the territory of what is assumed 
to be natural and given toward a greater recognition of the role of social and 
political power in determining sexual identities.
Codified in the language of ‘sexual and reproductive rights,’ feminist and 
LGBTI movements have sought to consolidate a sexual agenda that overcomes 
sexual and gender stratifications (Miller 2000). Diverse demands have converged 
under this umbrella, including legalization of abortion, same-sex marriage, access 
to modern contraceptives, recognition of transgender bodies and expressions.
The sexual and reproductive rights agenda has called into question the pre-
dominance of the sexual order defended by more traditionalist sectors. In Latin 
America, the hierarchy of the Catholic Church and more conservative factions 
of Protestantism are the principal actors whose sexual mores have been ques-
tioned by this robust agenda. Faced with this reality, traditionalist religious sec-
tors have reacted by seeking to utilize political power and intervention in order 
to slow the advance of feminist and LGTBI agendas (Htun 2003; Vaggione 2005).
However, the ways in which activism in opposition to sexual and reproduc-
tive rights has developed have not been uniform. Conservative churches have 
not been the only organizer of anti-feminist and LGBTI agendas. There has also 
been a convergence of other actors committed to an agenda practically identi-
cal to that of the ecclesiastical hierarchies, that is prioritizing the defense of 
a traditionalist sexual morality. Academic religious institutions and actors, lay 
movements, bioethicists, and parliamentary groups, among others, compose an 
activist front opposing sexual and reproductive rights and participate in dis-
putes around sexual policies (Felitti 2011; Gudiño Bessone 2014; Irrazábal 2013; 
Peñas Defago 2010). The diversity of actors that take part in this activism has 
largely converged under the label of ‘Pro-Vida’,2 emulating the ‘Pro-Life’ groups 
formed in the United States in the 1970s. The ‘Pro-Life’ coalition operates as a 
social movement with a political identity. Under this self-assigned name, these 
actors sustain a common agenda centered on the defense of a conservative 
1 This acronym refers to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex.
2 ‘Pro-Vida’ is the Spanish translation of ‘Pro-Life’. I intentionally use the term ‘Pro-Life’ 
with capital letters in order to highlight the concept in the grammatical form of a proper 
name and not as an adjective. The use of the concept as an adjective responds more 
to a political exercise than to a descriptive category, by which self-recognition as pro-
life or ‘in favor of life,’ automatically assigns a character of attacking the lives of those 
who oppose their worldview and demands, especially feminist and LGBTI movements. 
In the same way, I emphasize the idea that the label ‘Pro-Life’ is a way in which these 
organizations name themselves, and not a label that enjoys academic or political 
consensus. However, and despite being a self-designation, the ‘Pro-Life’ label generates 
controversy even within the conservative field (see Irrazábal 2013).
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sexual order based on heterosexuality, matrimony, monogamy, and reproduc-
tion.
The forms of collective action with which ‘Pro-Life’ activism in Latin America 
experiment have also evolved over time. One of the most important transfor-
mations is the designation of civil society as a battleground for practices of 
activism. Among the multiplicity of actors that converge under the ‘Pro-Life’ 
agenda, in recent decades the ‘Pro-Life’ movement has created a series of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) to oppose sexual and reproductive rights. 
‘Pro-Life’ NGOs have come to represent a nucleus of opposition that transcends 
the actions of churches, professionalizing their actions and developing impact 
strategies that complement the traditional religious forms of resistance conse-
crated by the ecclesiastical leadership.
In this article, I seek to describe the ways in which the field of ‘Pro-Life’ activ-
ism has come to prioritize the formation of NGOs as an impact strategy in dis-
putes about sexual politics in Argentina, especially from the eighties.3 At the 
same time, I analyze the principal transformations that these new actors in the 
field of opposition to sexual and reproductive rights have undergone in recent 
years. To do so, I concentrate on three strategic NGO actions: the turn towards 
the state, the erasing of the religious, and their process of federalization and 
civil ecumenism.4
Religion, Secularization and Sexual Politics
From its beginnings, classical social theory assumed as evident the hypothesis 
that the world would progress towards a complete secularization (Casanova 
1994). Auguste Comte, for example, conceived religion as a primitive stage, con-
trary to the positivist stage that characterizes modern age. Karl Marx under-
stood religion as a conservative force that supported the dominating bourgeois 
structure, and augured its demise with the arrival of the communist society. Max 
Weber observed, in contrast to the prominent religious order of the pre- modern 
world, a gradual process of rationalization and disenchantment of societies. 
Thus, in one way or another, classic authors of modern social theory embraced 
the paradigm of secularization that foreshadowed the decline of religion, influ-
encing a number of twentieth-century sociologists.
3 For methodological purposes, I consider as ‘Pro-Life’ all those NGOs that defined 
themselves as such, or that indicate that their work is oriented to the defense of life 
from conception, heterosexual family or related.
4 This research was carried out using qualitative and quantitative methodologies. The 
primary sources consulted were: a) in-depth interviews with 13 members of the self-
proclaimed ‘Pro-Life’ NGOs in Argentina, carried out between 2010 and 2014; b) websites 
of the NGOs being studied; and c) documentary and informative materials produced by 
these NGOs. A review of national print journalism was also carried out, utilizing the 
newspapers Clarín, Página 12, and La Nación, for the years 2000 to 2011. Based on the 
data generated, a mapping of the NGOs was also carried out, complemented by an 
online search using specific search terms and the application of the snowball method to 
reach other organizations that were not found in the initial exploration.
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However, the sociology of religions has undergone transformations that 
today allow us to understand the relationship between politics and religion in 
a different way. As Peter Berger says, ‘it is important to relegate to oblivion a 
notion […] (often termed “secularization theory”) that modernity brings the 
decadence of religion’ (Berger 2005: 7). One of the most important analyzes for 
understanding the failure of the secularization paradigm is provided by soci-
ologist José Casanova (1994). For him, the theory of secularization traditionally 
defended by sociology was based on three theses. The first one argued that 
modernity would lead to a growing process of privatization of religion. The 
second thesis announced that religion was advancing towards its decay, in a 
process whereby religious beliefs would definitely disappear. And the third one 
proposed that the secularization process will lead to the increasing of an struc-
tural differentiation between different social areas, including the separation of 
religion from politics.
The predictions of these theses, as Casanova points out, are now unsustain-
able. Empirical evidence has shown that, with specific exceptions, not only 
the number of people in the world who nowadays ascribes to a religion has 
remained (and in some cases even increased), but religion, far from being priva-
tized, remains politicized and keep on influencing decision-making processes in 
various ways (Berger 2005; Casanova 1994). While religious institutions are no 
longer the hegemonic center that organizes institutions and social ties (Casa-
nova 1994), ‘the religious realm takes on new forms that are neither single-
minded, centralized, nor covering all of social reality’ (Mallimaci and Giménez 
2007: 47).
Religion today enters the political arena to defend specific ideas but also to 
participate in the disputes that are part of contemporary democracy (Vaggione 
2005). The debates on sexual politics are an area in which the political presence 
of religion is quite evident (Htun 2003), and this has created new challenges 
for research. On one hand, some scholars have begun to delve into the links 
established between some progressive religious sectors and feminist and LGBTI 
politics (Jones and Cunial 2012; Vaggione 2005). The agenda of sexual and 
reproductive rights has allowed some religious sectors to pluralize their ideas 
on sexuality. Feminist theologians, or groups such as Catholics for Free Choice 
who defend the right to abortion from a Catholic identity, challenge traditional 
mandates held by more orthodox religious factions. On the other hand, the 
advance of the feminist and LGBT agendas have provoked the reaction of the 
most conservative religious sectors, largely led by the hierarchy of the Catholic 
Church and some factions of Evangelism (Vaggione 2005).5 These religious sec-
tors have sought to halt the advance of the agenda of sexual and reproductive 
rights (Htun 2003) through what Juan Marco Vaggione (2005) has called ‘reac-
tive politicization.’ Despite the legal models of formal secularism (or laicidad) 
that have been applied in several countries in Latin America, religion continues 
to be a key player in defining certain politics, and it is precisely in sexual politics 
that its presence has intensified in recent years.
5 The evangelical field in Argentina is divided into two major poles, the ‘liberationist 
historical’ and the ‘biblical conservative.’ While the former has tended to support 
recognition for some sexual and reproductive rights, the latter has a conservative 
ideological position (Jones and Cunial 2012).
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The attempt of some religious actors to control sexuality intensified during 
the second half of the twentieth century, as a reaction to the changes gener-
ated by the feminist and LGBTI agendas. The politicization of the body, the 
deprivatization of intimacy, the sexualization and gendering of the public 
sphere, among other political processes, are resisted by the most conservative 
factions of religions. Although regulation of sex and pleasure were always part 
of the concerns of the ancient religious systems (Figari 2007), the emergence of 
a new conservative religious activism, obsessed with sexuality and sexual and 
reproductive rights, marks a new temporality in the relationship between reli-
gious politics and sexual politics. We witness the emergence of a phenomenon 
that, although it maintains continuities with the past, presents novelties that 
allow to characterize it as a new kind of religious conservative movement.
Prioritization of Civil Society: ‘Pro-Life’ NGOs
While the Catholic hierarchy and conservative evangelical churches play a key 
role in the opposition to the agenda of sexual and reproductive rights in Latin 
America, since the 1980s ‘Pro-Life’ actors have developed other forms of activ-
ism that transcends the actions of these churches. Given the diversity of stra-
tegic actions, multiplicity of fields of action, and their reach, perhaps the most 
notable form such actions have acquired is as ‘Pro-Life’ NGOs (Mujica 2007; 
 Vaggione 2005). These organizations sustain sexual politics consistent with the 
positions of conservative churches.However they appeal to broader audiences 
and project a public image that garners more legitimacy than the churches do.
In contrast to other not-profit organizations, such as universities, sports clubs, 
unions, or churches (that is, organizations concerned primordially with the inter-
ests of their own members), these NGOs can be considered as networks of freely 
associated citizens that lack state authority and seek a good that they present as 
common or public (Berger 2003). ‘Pro-Life’ NGOs constitute actors that present 
themselves in public space as representatives of interests that they take upon 
themselves on behalf of the social body as a whole. Conservative religious activ-
ism utilizes the mobilizing power of NGOs to defend the same conservative sex-
ual politics of the church, under the guise of defending greater public interests 
and encompassing a wider community beyond that of the church. This process 
of collective mobilization seeks to transcend the ecclesiastical, and legitimates 
itself as a form of democratic participation capable of achieving a greater social 
and political impact.
In the regional context of social transformations in which civil society has 
acquired growing protagonism, the presence of NGOs responds to a way in 
which conservative religious activism has adapted to the particular contexts of 
contemporary Latin American democracies. As Nuria Cunill Grau points out, 
civil society’s current protagonism resides in its capacity to mobilize ‘social sec-
tors and public opinion on issues of public interest to influence the direction of 
policies…based on democracy itself’ (2007: 120). So, the formation of ‘Pro-Life’ 
NGOs implies a direct form of acting through the use of channels opened and 
legitimated through post-dictatorial processes. As such, the political incidence 
of these sectors is situated in strictly democratic terrain; based on an image and 
legitimacy different to that which religious leaders or civil organizations portray 
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when principally advancing their members’ interests. In the words of an activist 
from a ‘Pro-Life’ NGO:
Civil society, the fact that you’re the man on the street, helps for people to listen 
to you and not to label you before listening to you. That is, ‘What do you think 
about abortion?’ ‘Well, I’m against it.’ Then they say, ‘Okay,’ and maybe they 
label you and don’t let you say why and convince them, or give them arguments 
that at least leave them thinking about it (‘Pro-Life’ Activist, Córdoba 2012).
Although the public presence of ‘Pro-Life’ NGOs has become relevant, espe-
cially after the politicization of such issues as abortion and marriage equality,6 
their origins in Argentina precede the emergence of these issues in the public 
agenda. Some of these NGOs were founded in the first half or in the middle 
of the twentieth century, even before the ‘Pro-Life’ movement was founded in 
the United States and Europe. It was only at the end of the century when they 
incorporated this activism, adapting their agendas to the issues of sexual politics 
based on rhetoric strongly centered on the idea of ‘life’.
Thus, even though throughout the twentieth century there existed in the 
country a form of conservative activism that operated within civil society 
through NGOs, it was not until the eighties that they began to use the label ‘Pro-
Life’ as a form of political identification. As Fortunato Mallimacci and Veronica 
Gimenez Beliveau (2007) indicate, in the twenties and thirties the Vatican pro-
moted what it called ‘integral Catholicism’, that is, a call to the faith commu-
nity to occupy political, economic, educational, and professional areas, among 
 others, to bring Catholicism to society. Through this framework organizations 
such as the Consorcio de Médicos Católicos (Consortium of Catholic Doctors) 
(Buenos Aires, 1929) or the Corporación de Abogados Católicos (Corporation 
of Catholic Lawyers) (Buenos Aires, 1935) emerged, with the goal of promot-
ing Catholicism in professional spaces. Other organizations were formed in the 
middle of the twentieth century as a response to the debates provoked by the 
social transformations that began to question the traditional roles of men and 
women in public and domestic spaces. This is the case of organizations such as 
Liga de Madres de Familia (League of Housewives) (Buenos Aires, 1951) and Liga 
por la Decencia (League for Decency) (Santa Fe, 1963) or Tradición, Familia y 
Propiedad (Tradition, Family, and Property) (Buenos Aires, 1967), to name a few. 
The debates of the mid-twentieth century around divorce, the incorporation of 
women in the workforce, and the regulation of sex work were some of the issues 
prioritized by this activism, organized around a discourse focused on the idea 
of ‘the family’, always understood as conjugal, monogamous,  heterosexual, and 
 reproductive. But it was only with the sexual agenda that the  Vatican promoted 
in the last quarter of the twentieth century, which was reinforced through a 
discourse based on defense of ‘life,’ that the agendas of these organizations 
founded in the early and mid-twentieth century evolved, adapting to the con-
figurations of the budding ‘Pro-Life’ movement.
Other current ‘Pro-Life’ NGOs were created during the last military dictator-
ship (1976–1983). But it was not until the return of democracy in 1983 that the 
majority of these organizations were constituted. This is how the idea of ‘life’ 
6 In 2010 the law that allows for marriage between people of the same sex was approved 
in Argentina, after an intense period of politicization and debate.
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slowly introduced itself as the central axis of this activism. The Catholic Church 
coined the term ‘Pro-Life’ in conjunction with the international Catholic agenda, 
prioritized by the Pope John Paul II, in opposition to abortion. Of course, the 
discourse in defense of ‘the family’ has not been abandoned by this new activist 
turn, but since the last quarter of the twentieth century it gradually began to be 
reinforced through the idea of ‘life,’ which would acquire a dominant position 
as the organizing theme of conservative religious activism.
The development of these NGOs has not been linear, but rather has accom-
modated itself in various ways to the socio-political processes of the local 
context. Figure 1 shows their development in Argentina. Through an overall 
mapping, 140 ‘Pro-Life’ NGOs were found in the country, the majority of which 
still operate. Among these, information regarding the year they were founded 
was retrieved for 63.6% of the total organizations mapped.
Compared with the incipient process of NGO creation in the 1980s and early 
1990s, beginning in the mid-1990s we can note an increase in the quantity of 
groups formed in Argentina. On one hand, this coincides with the celebration 
of two international United Nations conferences focused on the consolidation 
of sexual and reproductive rights at the international level: the International 
Conference on Population and Development held in Cairo in 1994 and the 
Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995. On the other hand, 
it also coincides with the process of constitutional reform carried out in 1994 
in the country, for which the issue of abortion was a highly contested issue 
after the attempt by the government of Carlos Menem to introduce a consti-
tutional clause to protect life beginning at the moment of conception. In this 
context, various ‘Pro-Life’ NGOs were formed in response to the advance of 
sexual and reproductive rights at the local and international levels in order to 
combat these advances; which worked to mobilize political participation in key 
moments. Then, beginning in the twenty-first century, another small increase 
in ‘Pro-Life’ NGOs is observed, precisely in the period when the demand for the 
decriminalization/legalization of abortion began to gain strength once a series 
of laws and policies favorable to sexual and reproductive rights was debated 
and approved. However, from 2010–2014 we have witnessed a virtual ‘explo-
sion’ of NGOs, many of which were formed in reaction to the greater intensity 
of politicization as a result of the debate over the legalization of same-sex mar-
riage in the country in 2010.
In the face of the politicization of issues linked to sexuality and reproduc-
tion, civil society became a preferred arena among ‘Pro-Life’ activists to dis-
pute sexual politics. However, this has not always led to uniform action. We can 
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Figure 1 ‘Pro-Life’ NGO Foundation in Argentina (absolute values).
N=89 (NGOs with information available regarding date of founding) Source: Original 
work.
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identify three general strategic movements taken by ‘Pro-Life’ NGOs in recent 
decades. The first of these is linked to a ‘turn to the state’, that is, a change in 
their strategic footing in which activists shifted from primarily seeking impacts 
at social and cultural levels to trying to influence legislation and public policies. 
Secondly, there has been an ‘identity movement’ which has had the effect of 
erasing the religious identities of public institutional actors. Finally, these orga-
nizations are also undergoing a process of ‘civil ecumenism and federalization’ 
at present through which they have tried to coordinate activism at the national 
level in a way transcending religious divisions.
First Movement: ‘Pro-Life’ NGOs’ Political-State Turn
Following the experience of the United States and the formation of the ‘Pro-
Life’ movement in the 1970s, the first Argentine NGOs self-identified as ‘Pro-
Life’ were formed in the 1980s, including ProFamilia (ProFamily) (Buenos Aires, 
1983), Movimiento Familia y Vida (Family and Life Movement) (Tucuman, 1983), 
Grávida (Pregnant) (Buenos Aires, 1989), ProVida San Luis (Pro Life San Luis) 
(San Luis, 1989), Fundación Argentina del Mañana (Argentina Tomorrow Foun-
dation) (Buenos Aires, 1989), and Portal de Belén (Bethlehem Nativity) (Cordoba 
1991). In a period during which the interruption of pregnancy still did not enter 
strongly into the public agenda of the country and of the media (Brown 2008), 
conservative organizations, these first NGOs concentrated their actions preemp-
tively on the issue of abortion. This contrasts with the United States, where 
the ‘Pro-Life’ organizations were created in a moment of great politicization of 
the issue (Munson 2008). Only beginning in the early twenty-first century did 
issues associated with sexual diversity enter more strongly in the agendas of 
these organizations, in keeping with incipient debates that developed publicly 
around these issues at that time.7
In general, the first ‘Pro-Life’ NGOs tried to defend their position by seek-
ing symbolic and cultural impact with the intention of influencing social opin-
ions, perceptions, ideas, and beliefs connected to sexuality, reproduction, and 
practices in these areas. Fundación Argentina del Mañana, created with the 
goal of influencing program content in the media, is a paradigmatic example of 
this approach. Through diverse strategies, such as sending letters to television 
stations, making presentations to the Federal Radio Broadcasting Committee 
(COMFER), or establishing alliances with the sponsors of certain television pro-
grams, over the course of more than 20 years, this NGO has sought to influence 
media content in Argentina according to the Catholic Church’s sexual ideologies 
and as a way to impact public opinion.
Another method of strategic action carried out by the first ‘Pro-Life’ NGOs 
focused on the provision of services in order to care for specific sectors of the 
population, principally pregnant women of limited resources, in efforts to 
decrease their use of abortion. In the Latin American context neoliberal policies 
of the 1980s had limited the power of the state as an entity capable of provid-
ing certain basic services to the most disadvantaged sectors of the population. 
7 Especially after the debate and approval of the civil unions law in the city of Buenos 
Aires in 2003.
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These policies were most actively implemented in Argentina during the govern-
ment of Carlos Menem between 1989 and 1999, and as a result, many ‘Pro-Life’ 
NGOs presented themselves as an alternative to the state’s diminished capacity. 
As such, providing welfare services was transformed into a privileged way of 
working for some of these NGOs, such as Gravida or Portal de Belén, to achieve 
social impact on specific sectors of the population, with the principal goal not 
necessarily that of personal development of those helped or of overcoming the 
conditions of vulnerability, but rather that of avoiding pregnant women turn-
ing to abortion. In the words of an activist from a ‘Pro-Life’ NGO:
Who are we going to help, principally? We decided that it had to be helpless 
women. Some women might need shelter, food and shelter, others might need 
medical attention, others might need legal attention too. So the idea is to be the 
friendly hand that every pregnant woman in a situation of conflict needs to not 
abort (‘Pro-Life’ Activist, 2010).
However, the further politicization of abortion beginning in the 1990s (Brown 
2008), and the creation of the pro-choice group MADEL (Women Self-Orga-
nized to Decide Freely) in 1994, coupled with the trans-nationalization of sexual 
and reproductive rights, resulted in the reorganization of these ‘Pro-Life’ NGOs. 
Their traditional activities in the cultural and welfare areas were complemented 
by new strategies that sought not only to impact certain populations but also 
to colonize the state and influence the configuration of public policies and the 
law.
During the 1990s, international United Nations conferences (especially the 
International Conference on Population and Development in 1994 and the 
Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995) were instances of great politi-
cal prioritization and visibilization of feminist agendas (Álvarez 1998). These 
spaces also marked a moment of intense mobilization on the part of conserva-
tive religious sectors at the global level, as they created forms of activism aimed 
at resisting the international recognition of sexual and reproductive rights. At 
this time, the Vatican established alliances with some states that supported its 
sexual politics (among them, Argentina). A series of NGOs joined this alliance 
and since then have used international activism in defense of a sexually restric-
tive model. Some ‘Pro-Life’ NGOs came to the fore in Argentina oriented more 
to political work in international spaces. For example, in 1994 the Catholic NGO 
Familias del Mundo Unidas por la Paz (Families of the World United for Peace, 
FAMPAZ) was formed in Buenos Aires, which would participate in 1995 in the 
preparatory meeting for the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing.8
In the same way, beginning in the 1990s and early 2000s, a series of NGOs 
began to appear throughout the country that incorporated local impact strate-
gies on state decision-making spaces into their agendas. These organizations 
gradually began to develop lobbying strategies: presentations in legislative are-
nas, follow-up on bills, consulting for provincial and national legislators, col-
lections of signatures to solicit the modification of certain laws or policies, etc. 
NGOs like the Unión de Entidades por Una Vida Más Humana (Union of Entities 
for a More Human Life) (Mendoza 1995), SOS Vida (SOS Life) (Chaco 1998), Pro-
Vida (Pro-Life) (Buenos Aires 2000), the Fundación 25 de Marzo (March 25th 
8 See http://www.fampaz.org/actividades.html.
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Foundation) (Córdoba 2002), and the Centro de Bioética, Persona y Familia 
(Center for Bioethics, Person, and Family) (Buenos Aires 2009), among many 
others, make up only some examples of this. Additionally in this period, some 
of the organizations founded in the 1980s and early 1990s reorganized their 
strategies in order to incorporate political action in their activities.
The political impact on the state was reinforced in some cases by the incur-
sion of some activists into the field of electoral politics. While it is not a uniform 
strategy within the movement, some activists in ‘Pro-Life’ NGOs gradually began 
to run for popularly elected office in order to enter into legislative spaces. This 
has been the case, for example, with the organizations from Córdoba, Mujeres 
por la Vida (Women for Life) and Portal de Belén. Cristina Gonzalez de Delgado, 
president of Mujeres por la Vida, ran in 1999 as candidate for provincial legisla-
tor for the party Acción por la República (Action for the Republic), founded by 
Menem’s ex-minister of economics, Domingo Cavallo. Similarly, Rodrigo Agrelo, 
member of Portal de Belén, was provincial legislator for the party Unión de Cen-
tro Democrático (Democratic Center Union) and candidate for deputy governor 
in the province of Córdoba in 2003 for the multi-party alliance Frente de la Leal-
tad (Loyalty Front), whose presidential candidate was Menem. In 2009, founder 
and then president of Portal de Belén, Aurelio Garcia Elorrio, participated in 
provincial legislative elections for the party Encuentro por Córdoba (Meeting 
for Cordoba). Additionally, although he was not elected at that time, in 2011 he 
gained a seat in the provincial legislature as part of the party Encuentro Vecinal 
Córdoba (Cordoba Neighbors’ Meeting).
In addition to their impact on the political decision-making process, in the 
early twentieth century some NGOs began to develop strategies for legal action 
in the courts. The constitutional reform of 1994 allowed civil society organiza-
tions for the first time to initiate legal actions in the form of a writ of amparo 
(Peñas Defago 2010). This new form of political intervention and the end of the 
Menem regime led various ‘Pro-Life’ NGOs to make extensive use of legal strate-
gies, with the goal of delaying the implementation of certain policies or avoid-
ing people having access to certain sexual and reproductive rights guaranteed 
by law (Peñas Defago and Morán Faúndes 2014).
As Mala Htun (2003) points out, in Latin America the windows of opportunity 
for the approval of policies favorable to sexual and reproductive rights usually 
come in political contexts of tension between the Vatican hierarchy and the 
administration in office. While in the 1990s public policies and legislation on 
sexual issues were generally marked with a conservative stamp because of the 
alliance between the Catholic hierarchy and the Menem administration, the 
breaking up of this alliance in the following decade (especially under the admin-
istration of Nestor Kirchner) implied a turn in Argentine sexual politics that was 
favorable to the proliferation of sexual and reproductive rights. Although many 
of the demands of feminisms and of LGBTI movements are still pending, the 
proclamation of the Sexual Health and Responsible Procreation law in 2002, 
the approval of the laws of surgical contraception and holistic sexual educa-
tion in 2006, the proclamation of marriage equality in 2010, the approval of 
the gender identity law in 2012, among others, are examples of the advances 
in issues of gender and sexuality that Argentina has experienced in the last 
fifteen years. Faced with this panorama, various ‘Pro-Life’ NGOs, such as Portal 
de Belén, Fundación 25 de Marzo, Mujeres por la Vida, Consorcio de Médicos 
Católicos, Corporación de Abogados Católicos, ProFamilia, and many others, 
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began to privilege legal strategies against sexual and reproductive rights even 
more in the face of the loss of alliances with the national executive power.
Second Movement: Erasing the Religious
A notorious characteristic of the initial ‘Pro-Life’ NGOs was their strong Cath-
olic stamp. In a period in which important evangelist civil activism had not 
yet appeared, the organizations created in the 1980s and early 1990s were 
strongly marked by the rhetoric and influence of the Vatican hierarchy, and 
many only presented themselves in public space as Catholic. Some of these 
were born under the protection of international Catholic organizations that 
began to operate in the region in the 1980s. Human Life International, a 
Catholic organization created in the United States in 1981, was one of the 
most important in this regard. Among its institutional goals is the training of 
leaders that defend the Vatican position on issues of sexuality, as well as the 
promotion of organizations aimed at the same end. Under its wing, diverse 
organizations from different countries in Latin America, such as Ceprofarena 
in Peru (1981), Movimiento Anónimo por la Vida (Anonymous Movement for 
Life) in Chile (1985), and ProFamilia in Argentina (1983), began to coordinate, 
with the common purpose of defending the sexual morals promoted by the 
Vatican. Of course not all of the ‘Pro-Life’ NGOs organized in Argentina in 
the 1980s were formed within the Human Life International circle. But this 
organization contributed to the growth of some NGOs and strengthened the 
activism of others, favoring the creation of a first wave of organizations that 
largely subscribed to an explicitly Catholic identity.
However, in the following decades, a shift occurred in the religious identities 
of these NGOs. On one hand, the first organizations began to unite Catholic 
activists and conservative evangelicals. Some even began to appear under a spe-
cifically evangelical identity, as was the case of Asociación Argentina de Aboga-
dos Cristianos (Argentine Association of Christian Lawyers) (Buenos Aires, 2001) 
or the NGO Plan 1.5 (Córdoba 2009). However, specifically evangelical groups 
remain a minority within this broader activist front (Table 1).
In some cases, however, transformations in the public religious identity also 
resulted in an erasure of any religious identification. This is the case of Asociación 
Civil Por Venir (Civil Association What is to Come) (Santa Fe, 2004), Elegimos la 
Vida (Choose Life) (Buenos Aires, 2005), Centro de Bioética, Persona y Familia 
(Buenos Aires, 2009), among many other NGOs that present themselves in pub-
lic space without an explicitly religious identity. As such, today in Argentina 
‘Pro-Life’ organizations present themselves in public spaces heterogeneously, 
with some of them appealing to an explicitly religious identity, either Catholic 
and/or evangelical, and others an identity not tied to religion, as seen in Table 1.
However, the presence of faith-based ‘Pro-Life’ NGOs and other ‘Pro-Life’ 
NGOs without a religious identification should not be reduced to a simple 
 religious/secular binary. The forms in which religion penetrates these groups 
are complex. With attention to the connection between the public institutional 
identities currently held by these organizations and the religious affiliations 
of their members and leadership, it is possible to sort this relationship in three 
general analytic categories:
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a) ‘Institutionalized religiosity’:
These NGOs are those whose members belong to a specific religion that is 
explicitly and publicly expressed as an identifying characteristic of the organiza-
tion. This is the case of the exclusively Catholic organizations that began to join 
the movement in the eighties and those that later followed this model, such as 
Consorcio de Medicos Católicos, Corporación de Abogados Católicos, Portal de 
Belén, Fundación 25 de Marzo, and others. On the evangelical side are organi-
zations such as Asociación Argentina de Abogados Cristianos, Mujeres Cristianas 
Marplatenses Alfa (Christian Women of Mar de Plata Alpha), and Fundación 
Red Para el Mundo (Foundation Network for the World).
b) ‘Internalized religiosity’:
These correspond to NGOs whose membership and/or leaders belong to a spe-
cific religion and who are committed to this religion’s ideas on issues of sexual 
politics, despite the fact that the public identity of the organization is not pre-
sented as religious. So, the denomination ‘internalized religiosity’ refers to the 
use of a secular institutional identity connected to a concrete internal religios-
ity of the membership. In this category we find organizations such as Centro 
de Bioética, Persona y Familia, for example. This organization usually presents 
itself publicly as associated with the field of science and law, and the discourses 
that its members use in spaces of political incidence usually refer to exclusively 
secular elements. However, this NGO was created by and is led by activists from 
Movimiento Fundar (Founding Movement), an organization recognized by the 
archbishopric of Buenos Aires and made up exclusively of Catholics who ‘work 
in cultural evangelization’ (Lafferriere n.d.). So, despite the commitment of the 
leaders of this NGO to the vision and position of the Catholic Church hierarchy, 
the religious aspect is often minimized when the group presents itself in the 
public sphere, consistent with Juan Marco Vaggione’s (2005) idea of ‘strategic 
secularism’. In this concept, it is assumed that the adoption of a secular posi-
tion responds to a strategy to achieve greater incidence in the political debate 
and penetrate spaces that would be difficult to enter with a discourse expressly 
based in faith and religious dogmas.
This does not mean that appealing to a secular public identity necessarily 
responds to a strategy of camouflage to hide the religiosity of the group’s 
Table 1 Public religious identities of ‘Pro-Life’ NGOs.
n %
With a public religious identity Catholic 51 36.4
Evangelical 6 4.3
With unspecified religious identity 2 1.4
Without a public religious identity 32 22.9
No data 49 35.0
Total 140 100
N=140. Source: Original work.
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membership. In the case of some NGOs, the activists do not necessarily hide 
their personal beliefs when presenting themselves in public spaces, but rather 
they make them secondary in order to strategically privilege secular arguments.
c) ‘Religious non-identification’:
This corresponds to the ‘Pro-Life’ NGOs that present a non-religious institutional 
identity and whose membership does not belong to one particular religion. This 
does not mean that they represent atheist groups (as a matter of fact, there 
are no ‘Pro-Life’ NGOs in Argentina that identify as atheist), but that in these 
NGOs the religious element is minimized with respect to the organization’s 
identity and that of its members in such a way that the organization lacks a 
specific religious identification, receiving activists who come from diverse reli-
gious practices or who do not practice any religion. As such, this kind of NGO 
favors a kind of ‘inclusive ecumenism’ among its members, that is, the participa-
tion of Catholic and evangelist activists, but also of activists who do not neces-
sarily have a religious affiliation. Organizations like Por-Venir (Santa Fe, 2003), 
Jóvenes Autoconvocados por la Vida (Self-Organizaed Youth for Life) (Córdoba, 
2004) or Elegimos la Vida (Buenos Aires, 2005) are examples of this kind of NGO. 
In the words of one activist belonging to an NGO of this kind:
[The organization] that I belong to does not have a religious or political iden-
tity…there are members of the Catholic faith, evangelical, there are guys that 
don’t practice a religion…What I want to say to you is this: we have understood 
that the only requirement for entering [the organization] is understanding that 
life is a valuable good that transcends the faith that each one of us believes in 
(‘Pro-Life’ Activist, 2012).
These three categories correspond to ideal types whose purpose is only to pres-
ent synthetically the forms taken today by the relationship between religious 
phenomena and ‘Pro-Life’ NGOs in Argentina. Through these categories, it is 
possible to observe the impossibility of immediately qualifying this movement 
as purely religious (Munson 2008), because within the movement religious and 
secular elements are brought together in a way making their relation with reli-
gious sectors more complex.
Third Movement: Federalization and Civil Ecumenism
The approval of same-sex marriage in July 2010 marked an inflection point in 
the development of the ‘Pro-Life’ movement in Argentina. The opposition to the 
legal reform galvanized the mobilization of this movement (Sgró Ruata 2011), 
who reached new levels of coordination at both the provincial and national 
levels. On the one hand, many of the NGOs that had worked primarily on the 
issue of abortion shifted their agenda in order to oppose marriage equality. 
On the other hand, the politicization of the debate generated an exponential 
increase in this kind of NGO throughout the country, many of which were cre-
ated during the process of discussion of the legislation after it was passed and as 
a reaction to it. Examples of the latter are the NGOs S.O.S. Familia (S.O.S. Family) 
(Catamarca 2010), Frente Joven (Youth Front) (Buenos Aires, 2010), Salvemos la 
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Familia (Save the Family) (San Juan, 2010), Familia Viva (Living Family) (Jujuy, 
2010), among others.
The approval of marriage equality was understood as a political defeat for 
these sectors and it triggered ‘Pro-Life’ activism to establish strategic initiatives 
aimed at strengthening connections among like-minded NGOs and capitalizing 
on the mobilization achieved in opposition to the legislative reform. Interest in 
consolidating institutional coordination at the national level among ‘Pro-Life’ 
NGOs was sparked by the successful campaigns led by liberal sexual and repro-
ductive rights organizations in 2005, such as Campaña Nacional por el Derecho 
al Aborto Legal, Seguro y Gratuito (National Campaign for the Right to Legal, 
Safe, and Free Abortion),9 and which placed abortion on the public agenda in 
2006, as well as the creation of the Federación Argentina de Lesbianas, Gays, 
Bisexuales y Trans (Argentine Federation of Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals, and Trans, 
FALGBT), which united a series of organizations dedicated to marriage equality. 
As a result, the Red Federal de Familias (Federal Family Network) was created in 
2010 to achieve a greater impact on national and provincial political agendas. 
The Red Federal de Familias united various NGOs under a common ideology 
founded on four ideas: 1) defense of human life from fecundation; 2) defense 
of marriage between a man and a woman; 3) respect for the ‘natural’ end of 
life; and 4) defense of the inalienable right of parents to educate their children. 
So, beyond the religious or party identities of the NGOs, the participation of 
each one in Red Federal de Familias is dependent on commitment to these ‘com-
mon minimums’.
This policy of common minimums has allowed these NGOS to bring together 
both Catholic and evangelical organizations, establishing themselves as a coor-
dinating node that manages to overcome the eventual differences based on 
theological world views or political difficulties derived from religious belief. 
In their upper echelons, tensions have existed for years between the Catholic 
hierarchy and the Argentine evangelical churches regarding the the entrance 
of evangelical leadership into a public space traditionally marked by Catholics. 
Although Catholic and evangelical religious leaders managed to establish alli-
ances in their senior leadership during the discussion of marriage equality and 
to coordinate joint actions in order to defend conservative sexual politics, this 
alliance did not necessarily imply overcoming the issues that had historically 
divided both sectors in the country (Jones and Cunial 2012). In contrast, at the 
level of ‘Pro-Life’ NGOs, activists have sought to minimize these differences, 
especially through the formation of Red Federal de Familias, setting aside the 
disputes between the leaders of each church:
We are also careful to not send a message as a group. It is not a matter of us being 
the church and all thinking alike. In some ways, the church sometimes, when it 
takes uncompromising positions, ends up cutting off dialogue…Red [Federal de 
Familias] is not religious. What it does have is respect, because the identity of 
each member organization is respected (‘Pro-Life’ Activist, 2012).
9 This initiative brings together various Argentine feminist and women’s organizations 
in favor of legal abortion (see Campaña Nacional por el Derecho al Aborto Legal, Seguro 
y Gratuito 2015).
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In this way, after the approval of marriage equality, the same ‘Pro-Life’ NGOs 
have reorganized based on what can be called ‘civil ecumenism’, that is, an alli-
ance in which they have sought to form an activism that sets aside the tensions 
between ecclesiastical leaderships for the sake of identifying and pursuing a 
shared agenda. This ecumenism at the level of NGOs, while made firm in 2010, 
has its origins some years earlier in the formation of the first organizations that 
presented themselves in public spaces without a particular religious identity, 
which I have called ‘religious non-identification’. However, civil ecumenism can 
be considered another step in the organizational dynamic of these groups, as it 
does not only relegate religious identity to the background to achieve coordi-
nation among NGOs belonging to different religions, but it also makes explicit 
an agenda of common minimums that favor the inclusion of diverse religious 
organizations in one federalized entity.
Conclusions
Civil society has been an arena given high priority by Argentine ‘Pro-Life’ activ-
ism in order to impact local sexual politics, directly confronting the posture 
adopted by feminist and LGBTI movements. In this area, the formation of NGOs 
has been an integral mechanism utilized by this movement in recent decades. 
The relevance that these organizations have acquired resides not only in the 
sustained increase in their number, as evidenced over the years, but also in the 
diversification of their strategic actions over time.
In the late 1990s Sonia Álvarez (1998) proposed the term ‘NGOization’ to 
refer to the way social movements had prioritized the formation of NGOs that 
seek to achieve certain social and political impacts through the institutional-
ization, specialization, and professionalization of their work. This dynamic, 
viewed critically through the lens of social movements theory, suggests that 
NGOs often end up acting as ‘neo-’ or ‘para-’ organizations instead of as ‘non-’ 
 governmental.10 Following Evelina Dagnino (2003), the state privileges NGOs, 
specifically by characterizing them as ‘the’ representatives of civil society. This 
has essentially led NGOs to abandon their organic links with social movements, 
reorienting their priorities in order to remain legitimate toward the state and 
the international agencies that finance them. These conflicting interests limit 
the discourses emanating from NGO, lessens the radicalism of their demands, 
and reduces the possibility of adopting politics that challenge injustices and 
exclusions reproduced by state, judicial, and economic structures.
However, for the case of Argentina’s ‘Pro-Life’ movement, the dynamic of 
NGOization does not appear to have ‘domesticated’ the demands and actions 
of this movement, precisely because these demands do not imply opposi-
tion to the forms of domination or political and economic exclusion that are 
denounced by other types of social movements. The cause of ‘Pro-Life’ activism 
does not aim its weapons against a system of power that produces inequalities 
(as patriarchy and heteronormativity do for feminist and LGBTI populations), or 
against institutions that have historically reproduced these regimes of power 
10 Álvarez (2009), however, later revises her critical position regarding this process.
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and domination. On the contrary, its agenda from the beginning has sought 
to impact judicial and political institutions so that they reproduce conservative 
sexual morals aligned with certain traditional structures of domination. Thus 
their goal is not to create a new map of power relations, but rather to conserve 
or restore the traditionally hegemonic map of patriarchal and heteronorma-
tive relations. This is why the process of NGOization of this movement, in its 
search to influence the state, the law, and sexual practices, has not restricted 
its agenda or goals, as its political project is not necessarily contrary to the nor-
malization of bodies and subjectivities carried out historically by political power. 
The application of the concept of NGOization within the context of ‘Pro-Life’ 
activism encourages treating it as an analytic-descriptive term that allows us to 
observe how the movement has privileged the formation of NGOs as a strategy 
for political and social impact.
A second definition of the concept of NGOization has been offered by Vag-
gione (2005), who has applied the term to refer to the ways in which religion 
has revitalized itself recently through the action of civil society organizations 
that mobilize in defense of religious doctrines sustained by certain churches. In 
applying this term to the self-proclaimed ‘Pro-Life’ movement, the concept is 
of great utility in explaining the emergence and actions of organizations that 
explicitly hold a specific religious world view, as a kind of ‘civil arm’ of cer-
tain churches. However, the term’s utility is limited because it does not allow us 
to completely capture the non-religious identity that some of the movement’s 
organizations have acquired. Principally, as I have shown above, some NGOs 
have sought to create a kind of activism that transcends religion, minimizing 
or erasing religious aspects as a form of presenting themselves in public spaces. 
Precisely the NGOs that I named under the concept ‘religious non-identification’ 
have stimulated coordination among activists of faith with others that do not 
necessarily belong to any religion, thus showing the difficulty of automatically 
associating the movement’s cause with a purely religious foundation. At the 
same time, the literature has shown that their discourse has also been uncou-
pled from religious ideas, appealing to secular arguments principally associated 
with law and science (Vaggione 2005).
Following Ziad Munson (2008), the link between this form of activism and 
religion should not be thought of as an all-encompassing relationship, but 
rather as two spheres that overlap in many points, but separate in others. While 
the Catholic hierarchy and some conservative evangelical churches are an active 
part of the activism against sexual and reproductive rights, the ‘Pro-Life’ move-
ment is not a mere extension of these churches. Its organization, which has 
been refined in recent years following the creation of Red Federal de Familias 
and which has united Catholic and evangelical organizations in the same space, 
has allowed ‘Pro-Life’ NGOs to free themselves from the historic frictions that 
permeate the relationship between the Argentine Catholic hierarchy and evan-
gelical churches, enabling them to advance in political coordination separate 
from the disputes that can exist between religious leaders. As such, it is not pos-
sible to consider the self-proclaimed ‘Pro-Life’ movement as a movement that is 
organized as a civil extension of churches. Today these sectors are undergoing a 
process of organization with uncertain consequences, and as such it is necessary 
to continue observing it attentively and analytically.
Assuming that the opposition to sexual and reproductive rights can tran-
scend religious associations implies rethinking the ways in which we tend to 
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consider the relationship between religion, secular life, and sexuality. In gen-
eral terms, the entrance of religion in contemporary sexual politics has tended 
to be interpreted under paradigms that associate the secular with advances in 
issues of sexual and reproductive rights and religion as inevitably connected to 
conservative positions. However, these binary frameworks of understanding 
restrict our appreciation of the dimensions through which the religious and 
the secular interweave with sexuality (Jakobsen and Pellegrini 2008;  Vaggione 
2005). This stereotype is called into question, among other things, by observ-
ing the ways in which ‘Pro-Life’ activism circulates a series of secular discourses 
and expressions of identity in order to defend sexually restrictive politics. Thus, 
by freeing themselves from the connection with religion, parts of these sectors 
have adopted a variety of mechanisms for defend a patriarchal and hetero-
normative sexual order while also appealing to discourses that traditionally 
have been understood to be outside of religion. The challenge becomes one 
of making analytical frameworks sufficiently complex to overcome the limita-
tions of perspectives that associate the secular with sexual progressiveness and 
social mobilization as necessarily a space of the transgression of traditional 
systems of power.
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